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Stewart: Torts--Contributory Negligence of an Automobile Passenger

STUDENT NOTES
from the wrongful act of the client. But under the quantum
meruit rule, why should not the contingent fee be taken into
consideration in finding the value of the services? In Pratt v.
Kerns, 123 Ill. App. 86, it was held that the entire contingent
fee might be recovered if the services were worth that much.
-ROBIT

E. SmALEY.

TORTs-CoNTRmuTony NEGLIGENCE Or Aw AUTOMOBILE PASSEN-

GER.-The son of the deceased drove an automobile onto a railroad crossing at a low rate of speed, and due to the fact that
the boards along the tracks were not as wide as the highway, the
right front wheel of the car dropped over the first rail beyond
the ends of the boards and the car was stalled. The deceased was
sitting on the front seat. While unable to move, the car was hit
by a fast moving train and the father and two other passengers
were killed, the driver escaping by jumping. It was mid-day.
Held, an automobile passenger must use such reasonable care for
his own safety as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise;
and a passenger failing to warn the driver that the boards between
the railroad tracks did not extend the full width of the highway,
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Waller v. Norfolk & Western Railway Company, 152 S. E. 13 (W. Va. 1930).
In previous cases the court has said that the negligence of the
driver cannot be imputed to a passenger. It is also said that the
passenger must use such care for his own safety as an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise in like circumstances. Young v.
Railroad Company, 96 W. Va. 534, 123 S. E. 433; Jameson v.
Railway Company, 97 W. Va. 119,. 124 S. E. 491; Pierce v. Railroad Company, 99 W. Va. 313, 128 S. E. 832; 18 A. L. R., note
p. 309, and cases there cited and reviewed.
It has been said by our court that the duty of the passenger
is less than that of the driver. Young v. Railroad Company, supra,
at p. 537. How much less, one is not able to determine.
As to whether the question of contributory negligence of an
automobile driver is a matter for the jury or a matter for the
court seems to depend upon the facts in each particular case.
"Where the facts which control are not disputed and are such
that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion from them,
the question of contributory negligence barring recovery is one
of law for the court." Krodel v, B. & 0. R. R. Company, 99 W.
Va. 374, 128 S. E. 824.
Four cases have been decided by our court which involved the
contributory negligence of a passenger in a car hit by a railroad
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train at a railroad crossing. In two cases the question of negligence was left to the jury, Young v. Railroad, supra; Pierce v.
Railroad, supra; and in the other cases, the question was decided
by the court, Jameson v. Railway Company, supra; and Wailer v.
Railway Company, supra. In the first two cases, the passengers
were in the rear seat, they were in cars for hire, and in the first
case the passenger remained in the car while in the second he was
either thrown or jumped from it. In the last two cases the
passengers were in the front seats of privately owned cars.
In the Young Case the court quotes with approval from Hermann
v. Rhode Island Company, 36 R. I. 447, 90 Atl. 813: "It cannot
be said as a matter of law that such a guest or passenger is guilty
of negligence because he has done nothing. In many cases the
highest degree of caution may consist of inaction. In situations
of great or sudden peril, meddlesome interference with those having
control * * * * may be exceedingly disastrous in its results."
"The duty of the passenger being less than that of the driver
and depending on so many different circumstances, is almost always
one for the jury." Young v. Railroad, supra. The court cites
the following: "BABBITT ON AUTOMOBmES, (3rd Ed.) par. 1656;
Drouillardv. Sou. Pac. Ry. Co., 36 Cal. App. 447, 172 Pac. 405;
Carnegie v. Gt. North. Ry. Co., supra; Baker v. Fields, 236 S. W.
170 (Tex. Ct. App. 1921); Black v. Chicago, Gt. West Ry. Co.,
187 Iowa 904, 174 N. W. 774; Howe v. Railway Go., 62 Minn. 71,
30 L. R. A. 684; 18 A. L. R., note, pp. 322-334."
See also to the effect that. contributory negligence is generally a
matter for the jury, Pierce v. Railroad, supra; Hines v. Johnson,
264 Fed. 465 (C. 0. A. Wash.) (1920) ; Weidlich v. Railroad Company, 93 -Conn. 438, 106 Atl. 323; McAdoo v. State, 136 Md. 452,
111 Atl. 476; Senft v. Railway Company, 246 Pa. St. 446, 92 Atl.
553; Vocca v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 259 Pa. St. 42,
102 Atl. 283; HUDDY ON AUTOMOBimES, par. 688 and cases cited;
45 C. J. 858.
In West Virginia the court has decided the question of negligence as a matter of law in two other cases involving crossing
accidents: Jameson v. Railway Company, supra; Krodel v. Railroad Company, supra; cases cited in 18 A. L. R. 317.
In the first of these cases it was held that a person killed at a
railroad crossing by a train which the deceased had an opportunity
to see and hear in time to warn the driver, so as to enable him
to avoid the accident, and he neither warned him nor took any
precaution for his own safety, the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
While the case denies the doctrine of imputed negligence yet,
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as a practical matter, if the passenger is bound to watch (1)
for trains on the track, and (2) for defects in the crossing, it
would seem that under the language of the court the passenger
cannot recover where the driver was negligent unless the negligence consisted of something which the passenger had no opportunity to prevent, such as suddenly swerving the car or stalling it.
The following question seems to be still in doubt: Can a
passenger go to sleep or be engaged in something requiring his
entire attention while the driver is approaching the crossing? In
the Young Case, supra, where the passenger was permitted to
recover she was holding a baby on her lap. In this case it does
not appear what the passenger was doing. It is submitted that
the duty on the passenger to be watchful of trains and at the same
time to be watchful of defects in the highway is a very severe
one and should not be extended to cases where the passenger was
doing something else which required his full attention.
-MMVILL STEWART.

FROM THE PHYSICAL TO T13 SOCIAL ScNCES-Rueff, Jacques,
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1929. xxxiv 159 pages.
This book is published under the auspices of the Institute for the
Study of Law at Johns Hopkins University, with the intention of
presenting a method whereby law may be rendered "scientific".
The introduction of twenty-three pages by Herman Oliphant and
Abram Hewitt of the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law is probably
the only part of the book which will be of interest to the lawyer.
Here the principal reasons for the confusion in law are stated
with force and illustrated with clarity. Three methods are in
common and occasionally conscious use among lawyers, namely
the transcendental, the inductive and the practical. The transcendental method "starts by assuming the existence of some general 'principles' within which the solution" of the concrete case
"is hidden away". (p. xii). Here the authors of the introduction
pause to make some very proper jeers about the origin and validity
of such transcendental "principles". The method assumes the
existence of a "natural law" composed of permanent principles
of right. The inductive method purports to derive the fundamental principles of justice from an examination of a number of
particular cases. The absurdity of this method is stated by the
authors thus: "If the principle thus 'induced' is no broader
than the sum of the previous eases which it summarizes, it obviously
does not and cannot include the case to be decided, which, by
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